Tuesday 3 November 2009
Since I’ve been deployed for roughly three months, now, and had the opportunity to watch and read some of the media coverage about Afghanistan during my recent trip to Iraq (I frankly haven’t had adequate time or internet access to follow the news prior to that trip), I feel as though I should share some thoughts on the reality of the situation here in Afghanistan with my family and friends.
My thoughts and opinions are based on personal observations, military briefs to which I have had access (though I obviously won’t discuss secret or classified information), and reading some insightful comments from people such as David Brooks of the New York Times. I am a physician, not a politician, so my interests are more aligned toward the delivery of health care than the trend of politics. I will also try to distinguish between facts and my perceptions. My intent is to share these perceptions, not initiate a political debate.
Who are the bad guys?
The enemies of peace in Afghanistan consist of a loose and fluid group comprised of the Taliban (religious extremists from Afghanistan and/or Pakistan), members of Al Qaeda from nations such as Chechnya, various tribes who are paid or incentivized to attack the Coalition or Afghan government, and individuals who are coerced or paid to perform violent acts. The numbers and allegiances are constantly changing, which is why it’s impossible to distinguish, separate, or even quantify this group at any point in time. There is no underlying or unifying philosophy or mantra of this disparate group, and their goals are not always aligned. The one thing that they have in common is a willingness to randomly attack the Afghan govt, coalition forces, or their own people in order to preclude a representative government and personal freedoms such as the education of women or religious tolerance.
Who are the good guys?
The Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Coalition Forces (68k or so US forces and various NATO troops). Only about 20% of US forces are actual combat soldiers, the rest are support troops. After the US, the largest percentage is from the UK and Poland. I believe that there are approximately 30+k NATO/UN troops. Afghanistan is roughly the size of Texas.
What is GEN McChrystal’s plan?
GEN McChrystal’s military career has predominately been spent with Special Operations and covert military units. Interestingly, he feels that success in Afghanistan cannot be achieved solely with military technology such as unmanned drones or special ops forces. He feels that a successful counter-insurgency strategy needs to focus on the protection of the majority of the populus rather than focusing on killing the bad guys. In fact, he has forbidden the use of large bombs that may be effective but have an increased likelihood of inflicting collateral casualties. That is logical and easy to digest from a couch back in the States, but the decision to place your soldiers, your brothers, at higher risk of injury or death in order to prevent theoretical collateral damage is brave and profound.
Essentially, the GEN sees a race or competition between the govt/coalition and the bad guys. The coalition is trying to build infrastructure and essential services that will potentially allow a representative government and society to be established, while the bad guys are trying to destroy infrastructure, government, and commerce. It’s always easier to destroy than to build, so the race is actually defined by which side can win the faith and commitment of the majority of the population. This is the essence of a successful counter-insurgency strategy. Unfortunately, protecting all major population centers, roads (there is only one main road in the country, but it is extremely long), and infrastructure requires a lot of soldiers and skill. There currently aren’t enough ANA, ANP, or coalition forces to adequately protect the important stuff, when the bad guys have the advantage of attacking anywhere, at any time, and having any violence reported in the media as a failure of governance.
What do I think we should do?
The previous discussion is fact rather than opinion. Here is my opinion. While I generally support compromise and it is my instinct to build a consensus when resolving a conflict, this is one case where only the extremes offer an adequate solution. I think that we either need to fully commit to a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy that will require tens of thousands more American soldiers, trainers, aggressive civil infrastructure efforts, and years of commitment, or we need to totally pull out. There is no adequate compromise or middle path. I wish there were. That’s what we’re doing now, merely treading water. Everyone over here is just desperate for a decision, and all are hedging their bets- the Afghan govt, the populus, and the US military. We all need to know what the stakes are, and I believe all is depending on the level of commitment that President Obama is willing to make. Locals, and some allies, are not willing to fully commit until they confirm the level of US commitment.
Honestly, I don’t feel passionately about which path is chosen, though I do feel that more troops are required if it is our goal to provide enough security for a more representative and stable government and society to be established, with the marginalization of the violent and extremist minority. That is how I would define success, and NATO, the UN, and most Afghanis agree. The most important thing, though, is just that A decision is made, one that is definitive and unequivocal. This is not a time or situation where half-measures are adequate.